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"REVERSE DISCRIMINATION" AND HIGHER
EDUCATION FACULTY
Joyce A. Hughes*
In this Article, the author critiques the use of "reverse discrimination"
claims by White plaintiffs to challenge the hiring of Blacks in
institutions of higher education. The author argues that "reverse
discrimination" is a myth since no such claim is possible when one
White candidate is selected over another; assumptions of inferiority are
implicit where such a claim is made when a Black candiate is selected
over a White candidate. In other words, allowing such a claim, even if
ultimately unsuccessful, implies a presumption of superiority on the
part of the White candidate. For this reason, the author argues that it is
improper to assume that "reverse discrimination" occurs any time a
Black candidate is chosen over a White candidate. If both are equally
qualifed, no such claim exists. The term "reverse discrimination" is not
neutral in tone and therefore should not be treated as f it is neutral in
application. The author concludes that institutions of higher education
must not allow fears of unfounded "reverse discrimination" claims to
prevent them from hiring, promoting, and granting tenure to Black
faculty.
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INTRODUCTION
[Tihe view of affirmative action as reverse discrimination that de-
stroys the careers of white ... professors is not supported by the
evidence .... There is an ever-widening gap between the reality
of continuing racism and the myth of reverse discrimination.'
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A., Carleton
College; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School. I appreciate the forum provided
by the Eighth Annual Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference to
discuss an earlier draft of this Article.
1. John K. Wilson, The Myth of Reverse Discrimination in Higher Education, J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Winter 1995/1996, at 88, 88.
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This Article focuses on suits by White faculty members against
predominantly White institutions2 of higher education where a Black
or African American person receives a benefit and "reverse discrimi-
nation ' is claimed. Such claims have not aided plaintiffs in any of the
cases discussed. Of course, many complaints of employment discrimi-
nation are never presented to a court. Moreover, ninety percent of
employment discrimination cases are resolved before trial.'
Even among reported cases in all industries and occupations,
few involve "reverse discrimination," and still fewer are judged
"meritorious. 6 If the disposition of claims by the Equal Opportunity
2. Subsequent references will not specifically qualify institutions with the
phrase "predominantly White." However, institutions still classified as Historically
Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) "by the Department of Education due to
their initial charter and mission [but which] have now become predominantly white
institutions" are not included. The Current State of America's Black Colleges and Univer-
sities, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDuc., Winter 1996/1997 at 75, 78; see also The Whitening of
Public Black Colleges and Universities, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1996, at 26
(discussing increased enrollment at public HBCU's).
3. In this Article, Black with a capital B can be synonymous both with color and
race or only one of these. The term is problematic as a person can be black (small b)
in color but not Black (capital B) meaning African American. For example, "[in the
United States, any degree of African ancestry makes a person black, while in Latin
America and the Caribbean any degree of non-African ancestry means that person is
not black." PETER WINN, AMERICAS-THE CHANGING FACE OF LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 277 (1992); see also Tom Morganthau, What Color is Black?,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 63 (discussing the "blurring of the color line" and the
definition of Blackness); F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? (1991) (discussing problems
and policy issues surrounding defining who is Black). For the reasons the Journal of
Blacks in Higher Education decided to use the word 'Blacks' in the title, see Why
"Black" and Not "African American "?, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1994, at 18.
4. See infra Part II (discussing the meaning of the phrase "reverse discrimina-
tion").
5. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). The
only out-of-court complaint based on White racial discrimination for failure to
hire as faculty that this author was able to locate was by a White man who was
one of 64 applicants for a teaching position at the University of Maine. He re-
ceived an out-of-court settlement. Race Relations on Campus, J. BLACKS HIGHER
EDUC., Autumn 1995, at 125. Between 1985 and June 1993 there were no allega-
tions of higher education faculty discrimination based on being White brought
before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). B. Denise
Hawkins, Race Rulings a Reality at Black Colleges, BLACK ISSUES HIGHER EDUC., Aug.
26, 1993, at 15. David Donaldson, president of the National Association of College
and University Attorneys (NACUA), noted that "[often when privileged White male
professors have been passed over for promotions and tenure they are reluctant to
bring suits and legal action because they know they can simply go somewhere else."
Id. at 16.
6. Myths and Realities about Affirmative Action, COMMITTEE REP. (Lawyers'
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Wash., D.C.), Spring/Summer 1996, at 4, 4. The
Committee Report referred to a Department of Labor study of over "3000 bias opinions
in federal district courts from 1990-94," id., and noted that only 100 involved claims
of reverse discrimination, and of those, "only six cases were meritorious." Id.
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Employment Commission (EEOC) in 1994-less than two percent of
complaints filed alleged "reverse discrimination" and only 0.2% of
these survived review'-are representative, "reverse discrimination"
is indeed a myth. Of course, when a White person is discriminated
against merely because he/she is White, then redress ought to be
available. Often privilege is claimed solely on the basis of Whiteness,
however. To the extent that a "reverse discrimination" claim is
premised upon the assumption of White superiority/Black inferiority,
then such claims should be rejected. But it is important to note what
is not a thesis of this Article, either explicit or implicit: it does not
contend that actual discrimination against the White majority
should ever be condoned.
The concept of "reverse discrimination" in employment is
linked to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 ("Title VII") and
affirmative action. If, whenever such efforts are undertaken or a
Black person is selected for a position, one is met with complaints of
"reverse discrimination," then inclusory efforts could lead to reduc-
tion of the minuscule number of Black faculty in higher education.
The number of Black faculty in all higher education is minute, but it
is even smaller in predominantly White institutions. As of 1991 there
were 520,324 full-time instructional faculty in institutions of higher
education, of which only 24,516 were Black.9 Thus, Blacks were
4.7% of full-time higher education instructional faculty. But less
than 2.5% of faculty members at predominantly White colleges and
universities are Black, and they are spread among approximately
3000 institutions." Of course, not all institutions have even one Black
faculty member."
The tiny percentage of Black faculty at White institutions con-
tradicts the idea of widespread "reverse discrimination" based on
the presence of African American faculty. Any effort to diminish the
7. Id. at5.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1994).
9. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 230 (1994).
10. Blacks are only 4.7% of all higher education faculty but about half are at
HBCUs, leaving approximately 2.35% at White institutions. DEBORAH J. CARTER &
REGINALD WILSON, MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUC., AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., 1994 ANN.
STATUS REP. 4 (1995).
11. In 1996, the 25 highest-ranked universities had 1084 full-time Black faculty
out of a total 35,414 full-time faculty. This means that at these institutions-in total-
Blacks made up 3.1% of the full-time faculty. On an individual university basis, the
percentage of Black full-time faculty ranged from a low at California Institute of
Technology (0.3%) to a high at Emory University (5.1%). The number of tenured Black
faculty is very small in this group-343 out of 14,194 tenured faculty, with three
institutions declining to provide information. The Status of Black Faculty at America's
Highest-Ranked Universities, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1996, at 32.
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fragile12 presence of African Americans in the Academy 13 would
detract from the benefits brought to all students by diversity of fac-
ulty.4 Also, it is probable that African American faculty can help
minimize
[o]ne frustrating aspect of being [a] black [student] on a
predominantly white campus .... [Tjhe chronic inabil-
ity of many white faculty members and administrators
to see black students as individuals rather than as rep-
resentatives of their racial group... fail[s] to give them
the kind of academic and professional advice they are
due as students.1
"Reverse discrimination" claims-actual or threatened-
should not be allowed to prevent the hiring and retention of Black
faculty in higher education. The term "reverse discrimination" ought
to be avoided as it is a value-laden concept which can and has been
used to denigrate African Americans.
Part I of this Article discusses Title VII and its relationship to
institutions of higher education. Part II considers development of the
"reverse discrimination" concept and Part III examines cases filed by
White faculty. Although White faculty may be the statistical norm in
higher education, that fact should not lead one to conclude that any
time a Black person is favored over the White "norm" that "reverse
discrimination" has occurred.
12. The word fragile is designed to highlight that African American faculty have
a tenure rate of only 42.9%. MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, AM. COUNCIL ON
EDUC., 1996-97 ANN. STATUS RFPT. 34. Thus the continued presence in higher educa-
tion of more than half of the African American faculty is not protected by tenure.
13. "Academy" refers to institutions of higher education and is derived from
the name of "the school for advanced education founded by Plato." WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1993).
14. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the
Supreme Court considered an affirmative action admissions policy; writing for the
court, Justice Powell stated that student diversity "clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education." Id. at 311-12. Faculty
diversity is also necessary if students are to be fully educated and not to be al-
lowed to wallow in the misguided idea that reality is homogeneous.
15. Joe R. Feagin & Melvin P. Sikes, How Black Students Cope with Racism on White
Campuses, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Summer 1995, at 91, 93. Although HBCUs are
less than five percent of all colleges and universities, "16% of all black college stu-
dents in the United States" were enrolled in such institutions in 1996. Vital Sign: The
Current State of America's Black Colleges and Universities, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC.,
Winter 1996, at 75, 78. In HBCUs students get "more people who provide Black
students with positive feedback, support and understanding, and who communicate
that they care about the students' welfare." Walter R. Allen, The Color of Success:
African American College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically Black
Public Colleges and Universities, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 40 (1992).
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I. TITLE VII AND HIGHER EDUCATION
[One] cannot imagine a more sensitive area than educational
institutions where the Nation's youth are exposed to a multitude of
ideas that will strongly influence their future development. To permit
discrimination here woul, more than in any other area, tend to pro-
mote misconceptions leading to future patterns of discrimination.'
Title VII proscribes employment practices that discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The statute makes it un-
lawful to discriminate on "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment"'" or to do things that "deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee? '" 8 By its explicit terms, the statute seeks to eliminate
discrimination in employment opportunities. However, a number of
authors have argued that Title VII has failed to address adequately the
employment needs of African Americans 9 who tend to lose reported Title
VII cases. °
16. Susan L. Pacholski, Title VII In the University: The Difference Academic Freedom
Makes, 59 U. CRi. L. REv. 1317, 1331 (1992) (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 19-20
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2136, 2155).
17 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
18. Id. Under the statute it is unlawful
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify ... employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Id.
19. See, eg., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act: The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RurGERS L REV. 965 (1993) (discussing
the obstacles to success posed by judicial assumptions about racial realities and restrictive
interpretation of Title VII); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis
in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1993) (discussing how application of
negative anti-discrimination laws according to a principle of racial neutrality replicates rather
than revises the status quo); Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VI's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW.
ENG. L REV. 219 (1994) (discussing the impossibility of effective enforcement posed by judi-
cial interpretation of the scope and importance of the governing principles of Title VII). For
example, "[w]hen asked to identify the type of cases that fell outside the 'important'
case category, [federal district court] Judge Stanley Sporkin identified... actions
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... "Id. at 219 (citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and Competent
Heterosexual White Men The Sexual and Racial Morality Underlying Anti-Discrimination
SPRING 19981
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Initially, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempted colleges and
universities from Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimi-
nation.2 When the exemption was eliminated in 1972,2 Congress
noted that "[lthere is nothing in the legislative background of Title
VII, nor does any national policy suggest itself to support the ex-
emption of these educational institution employees .... . Further,
it noted the "common knowledge" that "black scholars have been
generally relegated to all-black institutions, or have been restricted
to lesser academic positions when they have been permitted entry
into white institutions... .24Colleges and universities are now subject
to judicial scrutiny under Title VII.2' Despite congressional focus on
the paucity of Blacks and women in higher education, Title VII has not
been particularly effective in the university setting.2 By implication,
courts have not accepted the "common knowledge"--that Blacks have
Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 197 (1995) (discussing the 'winners' and
'losers' of anti-discrimination cases); Culp, supra note 19, at 985 (arguing that Blacks
are not likely to win Title VII cases). Of course, Title VII complaints can be resolved
before action; the claim may be compromised after an EEOC investigation, or an out-
of-court settlement of a lawsuit is reached before any record of the case appears in a
written compilation of cases.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1969)
(amended 1972).
22. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)). The statute continues to exempt
employers that discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin "in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise... ?" Id. The statute further allows educational institutions to hire on an
otherwise discriminatory basis if the institution is "in whole or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular
religious ... society, or if the curriculum ... is directed toward the propagation of a
particular religion." Id. Race is never a bona fide occupational qualification. See id.
23. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971).
24. Id.
25. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), the Supreme Court
concluded that the elimination of the exemption
was Congress' considered response to the widespread and compel-
ling problem of invidious discrimination in educational institutions ....
Significantly, opponents of the extension claimed that enforcement of
Title VII would weaken institutions of higher education by interfer-
ing with decisions to hire and promote faculty members. Petitioner
therefore cannot seriously contend that Congress was oblivious to
concerns of academic autonomy when it abandoned the exemption
for educational institutions.
Id. at 190 (citations omitted).
26. See GEORGE R. LANOUE & BARBARA LEE, ACADEMICS IN CouRT 23 (1987). The
authors document Title VII cases involving faculty members under the 1972 amend-
ments.
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difficulty in obtaining faculty positions in the Academy-to which
Congress referred in eliminating the exemption for higher education.7
The Supreme Court has not addressed the merits of a Title
VII discrimination claim in the academic arena.8 Consequently,
there are no Supreme Court standards specifically governing the
employment practices of academic institutions. However, the
Court has developed two modes of analysis applicable to Title
VII claims: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Although
disparate treatment and disparate impact are alternate theories, 29
the method of analysis chosen can have significant ramifications
on an aggrieved employee's prospects of success.'° "Disparate
treatment" is the descriptive term for the approach to Title VII
violations developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.3 The
crux of this analysis involves a discriminatory difference in the
treatment of similarly situated applicants. To establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, the plaintiff
must show that: 1) he/she is a member of a protected group; 2)
he/she applied for and was qualified for the position; 3) he/she
was rejected by the employer; and 4) the position remained open
while the employer continued to seek applicants with the plain-
tiff's qualifications. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
27. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. For discussion of Black and
women faculty in higher education, see generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Application of
the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NovA L. REV. 319 (1986)
(discussing the reasons behind a decline in the number of Black and female faculty at
institutions of higher learning); Len Biernat, Subjective Criteria in Faculty Employment
Decisions Under Title VII: A Camouflage for Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, 20
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 501 (1987) (discussing the need to use subjective criteria in faculty
employment decisions); Lynn S. Muster, A Proposal for the Hire and Tenure of Faculty of
Color in Higher Education, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 45 (1995) (critiquing the faculty
hiring process in higher education and its impact on non-Whites); Martha S. West,
Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L.
REV. 67 (1994) (discussing gender discrimination in higher education); Stephanie M.
Wildman, Integration in the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64
TUL. L. REV. 1625 (1990) (discussing the need for faculty integration in law schools).
28. The sole academic case addressed by the Supreme Court involved a sex
discrimination claim, Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978). In Sweeney,
the sole issue for review by the Supreme Court was the standard applied by the
Court of Appeals in determining the employer's burden of proof to dispute a prima
facie showing of disparate treatment. Id. at 24-25. The Supreme Court did not dis-
cuss the validity of the plaintiff's claim. See id.
29. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977).
30. See George R. Kramer, Title VII on Campus: Judicial Review of University Em-
ployment Decisions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1206, 1208 (1982).
31. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
32. Id. at 802. Although McDonnell Douglas was a hiring case, variants of its four
factors apply in the contexts of discharge, contract non-renewal, and tenure. See, e.g.,
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1995) (involving an employee who
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of discrimination, the employer must "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."3  The em-
ployer's reason "must be clear and reasonably specific" to raise a
genuine issue of fact.4 The burden remains on the plaintiff to show
that discrimination was the real reason for the decision-that there
are no other nondiscriminatory reasons, even those unmentioned by
the defendant.4 Although the burden of producing evidence shifts to
the employer once a prima facie case is established, the burden of
persuasion remains on plaintiff. Thus even if the employer can ar-
ticulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the decision,
the plaintiff still must show that the offered reason is a mere pretext
for unlawful discrimination.
The "disparate impact" approach, first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,6 does not require a
showing of discriminatory intent. It applies when facially neutral
employment factors have a disproportionately negative impact on a
protected group by effectively excluding its members. Under Griggs
an employer could justify disparate impact by demonstrating business
necessity and job relatedness.m The Civil Rights Act of 199139
enshrined a similar standard in legislation.4° As in the case of
disparate treatment,. after a prima facie case is established and
following the employer's satisfaction of its burden of production,
was demoted and then discharged). In Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d
316, 332 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit adapted the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie requirements to fit a university.
33. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
34. Id. at 258.
35. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 515-16 (1993).
36. 401 U.S. 424,431-32 (1971).
37. In Griggs, a high school diploma requirement would have excluded 88% of
Black state residents but only 66% of White residents. Id. at 430 n.6 (citation omit-
ted). Griggs also used tests that, in another case, the EEOC found to have a 94%
exclusion rate for Blacks but only a 42% exclusion rate for Whites. Id. (citations
omitted); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (holding that
employment tests are impermissible unless shown to correlate with relevant job
skills).
38. The Griggs Court found no justification for the measures employed. Griggs,
401 U.S. at 426. It was argued that they predicted success in the jobs to be filled but
there was no proof that the criteria were effective predictors. Id. at 431 n.7, 436.
39. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1994)).
40. This section provides that defendants have the burden of proving "that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity..... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). See generally Susan S. Grover,
The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REv.
387, 391-93 (1996) (showing how disparate impact analysis developed through the
application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act).
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then the plaintiff must show that the stated reason is merely a
pretext for discrimination. 1
Title VII prohibits discrimination because of color. Thus, a
"reverse discrimination" plaintiff claiming intentional discrimination
would allege adverse treatment because of being White. If disparate
treatment under Title VII is alleged, then it would be claimed that
the White is more qualified than a Black. Where Whiteness itself is
what arguably makes a person better qualified, the White person is
presumed superior. Although not the explicit rationale of "reverse
discrimination," this notion can undergird such claims.42 Indeed, in
careless language, the Eleventh Circuit stated the prima facie re-
quirements for "reverse discrimination" so that a White person can
complain when a minority group member is selected over him or
her. If one is permitted to assume that "reverse discrimination" oc-
curs any time a Black person is chosen over a White person, a
concomitant assumption is that the Black is inferior to the White. That
suggests Whiteness per se is automatically entitled to privilege. 4
II. "REVERSE DISCRIMINATION": A MISLEADING TERM
[Tihe limitations ... created by using the same language to
describe discrimination against Blacks and charges of reverse
race discrimination made by whites ... hinder the determina-
tion of an appropriate remedy for intentional discrimination
against African Americans.4'
41. Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 335-36 (4th Cir. 1980)
(modifying disparate treatment to accommodate the circumstances of academic
employment decisions). In Smith, the court concluded that a female assistant profes-
sor who was denied promotion, rehire, and tenure was unsuccessful in her
discrimination claims based on age, sex, and religion where she could not establish
that the university's proffered reasons for its actions were pretextual. Id.
42. See infra notes 99, 138. 139 and accompanying text.
43. In Shealy v. Albany, Georgia, 89 F.3d 804, 805 (11th Cir. 1996) and Wilson v.
Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 302 (11th Cir. 1991) the court indicated what a plaintiff must
prove to state a prima facie "reverse discrimination" case: (1) that she or he belongs
to a class; (2) she or he applied and was qualified for a job; (3) she or he was rejected;
and (4) the job was filled by a minority group member. The last item should have
been limited to unqualified members of minority groups to eliminate the implicit
assumption that any minority group member is less qualified than a White person.
44. Cf. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993)
(arguing that Whiteness has evolved into a protected property right).
45. Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound
Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43
EMORY L.J. 1, 19 (1994).
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The term "reverse discrimination"" was a conceptual outgrowth
of affirmative action, a term which can be traced back to a 1961 presi-
dential executive order.47 One definition describes affirmative action as
any measure, beyond simple termination of a discrimi-
natory practice, that permits the consideration of race,
national origin, sex, or disability, along with other
criteria, and which is adopted to provide opportunities to
a class of qualified individuals who have either histori-
cally or actually been denied those opportunities and/or
to prevent the recurrence of discrimination in the future.48
Thus affirmative action refers to efforts to "include in" those who
have historically been "excluded out."
One idea behind "reverse discrimination" is that the traditional
pattern of discrimination against oppressed groups is "reversed" to be
discrimination in their favor.49 This view of "reverse discrimination"
46. See generally Philip L. Fetzer, 'Reverse Discrimination': The Political Use of
Language, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 212 (1993) (discussing the use of the term "reverse
discrimination" as a weapon in the battle over an appropriate remedy for the histori-
cal exclusion of minorities from education); David Michael McConnell, Title VII at
Twenty-the Unsettled Dilemma of "Reverse" Discrimination, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1073 (1983) (discussing the trend of using Title VII to bolster claims of reverse
discrimination).
47. By an order of President Kennedy signed in March 1961, the pledge of
nondiscrimination required to appear in federal contracts was to be supplemented
by a clause restating the prohibition in positive terms: "The contractor will take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin." Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1959-1963). In part, contractors
were directed to advertise as equal opportunity employers and make special
recruiting efforts. Id.; see also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT (1993):
Stated simply, affirmative action is the use of race-conscious classifi-
cations for the reallocation of societal resources in a way that benefits
minorities. In theory, affirmative action and traditional antidiscrimi-
nation laws are analytically distinct. Antidiscrimination laws promote
race neutrality by prohibiting the adverse treatment of individuals or
groups based upon their race, while affirmative action departs from
the immediate goal of race neutrality in order to channel resources to
disadvantaged minorities in a way that is designed to advance the
long-term objective of racial equality.
Id. at 121.
48. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Briefing Paper on Affirmative Action [1995],
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, S-87 (Aug. 1, 1995), cited in Wendy Brown-Scott,
Unpacking the Affirmative Action Rhetoric, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 801,801 n.4 (1995).
49. KENNETH GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 16
(1983) (" 'Reverse discrimination' ... reverses the pattern of earlier discrimination.
Typically, more favorable treatment... is given to members of groups that have been
discriminated against in the past:').
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sees it as "[pirejudice or bias exercised against a person or class for
the purpose of correcting a pattern of discrimination against another
person or class."' Another aspect of "reverse discrimination" is the
notion that the race of the victim of discrimination is reversed from
what is usual-Black-to what is unusual-White. In this respect the
concept focuses upon alleged discrimination against those who his-
torically have been free from it. Consequently, "reverse
discrimination" is commonly thought of as "discrimination against
members of the white majority.""
Title VII applies to all persons, Black or White, male or female,
and requires the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifica-
tion[s]. ' 2 However, politicizing Title VII by reliance on the concept
of "reverse discrimination" is detrimental. But a fundamental prob-
lem lies in the degree to which "reverse discrimination" has redirected
the discrimination dialogue. Our current challenge is to "overcome
the more subtle forms of discrimination that actually masquerade as
race neutrality.5' Moreover, concern should be focused on actual
situations of discrimination rather than immediately assuming that
when a White person is denied a benefit that a Black receives it must
be because of "reverse discrimination." But even if that were the
assumption of White faculty bringing "reverse discrimination"
claims against institutions of higher education, in none of the cases
discussed in the next section were they successful.
50. Fetzer, supra note 46, at 216 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1186 (6th ed.
1990)). Fetzer chronicles the development of "reverse discrimination" in the popular
media:
A conservative columnist, James Kilpatrick, wrote "[A] more familiar
name for this abnormality is 'reverse discrimination.' The short and
ugly word is racism." In 1976, U.S. News & World Report commented
on "a practice known as reverse discrimination," without defining the
term .... That same year, a leading Republican politician used the
term. In his first bid for the presidency, Ronald Reagan commented,
"[I]f you happen to belong to an ethnic group not recognized by the
Federal Government as entitled to special treatment you are a victim
of reverse discrimination." Three years later, Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch and former Texas Governor, John Connally also used
the term. By the 1980s, "reverse discrimination" had lost its quotation
marks and was accepted into popular language.
Id. at 215.
51. Id. at 216.
52. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Five years after Griggs, in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., the Supreme Court concluded that
discrimination against Whites is prohibited by Title VII and section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. McDonald, 427 U.S. 273, 285, 296 (1976) (citations omitted).
53. SPANN, supra note 47, at 6.
SPRING 1998]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
IlI. WHITE FACULTY VERSUS PREDOMINANTLY WHITE UNIVERSITIES
When one deals with a sensitive topic, one must be as careful as
one can about the use of related terms, since variant connotations
can themselves be the source of serious misunderstanding."
Cases in which White faculty members at predominantly
White institutions filed "reverse discrimination" complaints to chal-
lenge employment decisions favoring Blacks have arisen in
Arkansas, Florida,-6 Illinois, s7 Michigan,"' New York, 9 Ohio, ° and
Pennsylvania.6 However, none of the plaintiffs in any of these cases
prevailed, which suggests the unstable foundations of such claims.
In the Arkansas case, plaintiffs abandoned their claims of "reverse
discrimination" before the court ruled.6 In both cases involving
Cleveland State University in Ohio, the decisions are unreported,
and a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rule disfavors citations of such
decisions, which undermines their precedential value." In the Florida
case, the White plaintiff received his initial appointment without
having to compete with any Blacks and claimed "reverse discrimina-
tion" when a Black was selected in later competition.6 Cases in New
York and Michigan 67 involved retrenchment where a White person
relieved of a position claimed "reverse discrimination" when a Black
obtained a position. The respective qualifications of White and Black
contenders were alleged to be at issue in the Illinois case." Compara-
tive reviews of Black and White faculty were actually undertaken in
54. GREENAWALT, supra note 49, at 15.
55. Rollins v. Farris, No. 86-1367, 1986 WL 8879 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 1986), aff'd,
822 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1987).
56. Palmer v. District Bd. of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior College, 748 F.2d
595 (11th Cir. 1984).
57. Hein v. Board of Trustees of Community College Dist., No. 90-C5372, 1992
WL 80546, at *3 (N.D. m. Apr. 10, 1992).
58. Reisman v. Regents of Wayne State Univ., 470 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990).
59. Solomon v. New York Human Rights Appeal Bd., 417 N.Y.S.2d 805 (App.
Div. 1979).
60. Day v. Cleveland State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 94-3403, 1995 WL 355672
(6th Cir. June 13, 1995); Evans v. Cleveland State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 90-3759,
1991 WL 93094 (6th Cir. June 3,1991).
61. Cohen v. Community College of Phila., 484 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
62. Rollins, 1996 WL 8879.
63. Day, 1995 WL 355672; Evans, 1991 WL 93094.
64. 6th Cir. R. 24 (c).
65. Palmer, 748 F.2d 595.
66. Salomon, 417 N.Y.S.2d 805.
67. Reisman, 470 N.W.2d at 680.
68. Hein, 1992 WL 80546, at *3.
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both a New York case involving an honorific designation' and in a
Pennsylvania case involving appointment to a regular faculty posi-
tion.7 Several of these cases are discussed at length below.
In Palmer v. District Board of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior
College,7' a White male vocal music teacher, who held a one time
nine-month appointment, claimed "reverse discrimination" when
subsequently he was not appointed to a permanent position.2 The
school's affirmative action plan mandated that anyone hired to a
position would be given only a temporary appointment if Black
candidates had not been considered. Because there were no Blacks
in the pool when the plaintiff Palmer was hired, he was appointed' • • 74
only to a temporary position. He did not later gain a permanent
position because a Black man was deemed to be more qualified.7
The court found that the affirmative action plan did not bar White
persons from being hired nor did it require or result in the hiring of
unqualified Black persons.76 In fact, the Black man selected remained
in the position for only one academic year, as the position of vocal
music instructor was abolished the year after his appointment;77
when the plaintiff's suit was adjudicated, the position did not even
exist.
In Salomon v. New York Human Rights Appeal Board,78 a tenured
White male Associate Professor of History and African Studies in the
African Studies Program at the State University College at New Paltz,
New York was dismissed because of retrenchment.7 Subsequently, he
69. Silver, 767 F. Supp. 494.
70. Cohen, 484 F. Supp. 411.
71. 748 F.2d 595 (11th Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 597-98.
73. Id. at 597. In 1973, the United States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that
"the State of Florida maintained a racially segregated system of higher education." Id.
at 596 (citations omitted). As a result of these findings, Florida adopted an affirma-
tive action plan which was approved by HEW. Id. at 596. This plan was at issue in
Palmer. Under the Plan, at least one qualified Black person had to be included in four
candidates recommended by the College's Search and Screening committee. Id. at
597. If a Black person was not included among those recommended, the person hired
for the position would receive only a nine-month temporary appointment. Id.
74. Id. at 598.
75. Id.
76. "The plan was designed to result in the hiring of a sufficient number of
qualified minority applicants so that the racial balance of the College's faculty would
approximate 10% of the total number of faculty, which was the balance that would
have been achieved absent the past discrimination." Id.
77. Id. at 598 n.11.
78. 417 N.Y.S.2d 805 (App. Div. 1979).
79. Id. at 806. Dismissing either tenured or nontenured faculty can be justified
where there is legitimate retrenchment.
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applied to be an Assistant Professor in Black Studies, a completely
separate department."0 The vacancy was filled by a Black man, and
Salomon alleged he was a "victim of a continuing policy against
hiring qualified professors who are white in the Black Studies De-
partment ... ."" The University argued that retrenchment caused the
plaintiff to be discharged because of his low seniority and he was not
hired in the Black Studies Department because there were no courses
being offered in his field of expertise, African History.82 The Black
male hired taught Introduction to Black Studies and History of Slav-
ery and not African History.3 Also, the Black man appointed to head
the Black Studies Department was a historian who had administra-
tive experience and had previously taught political science courses,
while the plaintiff had no administrative experience and had never
taught any courses in political science.8' The court found both of the
Black persons hired to be more qualified than plaintiff.5
Like Salomon, Reisman v. Regents of Wayne State University in-
volved retrenchment. In Reisman, the plaintiff, a professor in the
Division of Theoretical and Behavioral Foundations of the College of
Education of Wayne State University, claimed "reverse discrimina-
tion.' 87 She was initially employed as an associate professor for a
two-year term and her contract was renewed twice for one-year
terms." Before her fourth year, plaintiff applied for tenure.8 Plaintiff
was notified that her contract would not be renewed and that her
employment would terminate near the end of the academic year.9O
The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that plaintiff conceded that a
budget crisis required work force reductions and said "the evidence
overwhelmingly supports a finding that the decision not to renew
plaintiff's contract was motivated by economic necessity.'91 But the
plaintiff also claimed "reverse discrimination" because at the time
her contract was terminated, the contract of a Black male professor
who had been hired about the same time as she was in the same area
of guidance and counseling, but at a lower rank, was renewed.9 Both
80. Id.
81. Id. at 807.
82. Id. at 806.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 470 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 681.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 682.
92. Id. at 680.
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had two-year contracts beginning in 1979 and both had their contracts
twice renewed for one year." Around the time that plaintiff applied
for tenure and then had notice of non-renewal, the contract of the
Black male was renewed for another one-year term." The plaintiff
apparently believed that the Black male should have been cut by the
retrenchment instead of her.
The court said it was not enough to merely show that race was
a factor in non-renewal.95 Under the circumstances, the court held
that "plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to establish that race
was a determining factor in the decision not to renew her contract."96
Although a jury awarded plaintiff damages for "reverse discrimina-
tion' apparently based on Michigan's Civil Rights Act,9 an
erroneous jury instruction led to reversal.98 The reported case gives
no information from which one can conclude that the plaintiff was
more entitled to the position than the Black male.9
In Hein v. Board of Trustees of Community College District,'°° a federal
district court judge granted summary judgment to all defendants. 1'
Like Salomon, the Hein case was not based on Title VII but on Section
1983. '02 In a deposition, plaintiff said the basis of his complaint was
that "I was teaching, and there were no complaints about me. And a
93. Id. at 681.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 686.
96. Id.
97. MICH. COMP. LAws § 37.2101 (1979).
98. Reisman, 470 N.W.2d at 682.
99. Cf. Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506, cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1998). In Taxman, economic
necessity required that the Board terminate either the Black or the White female high
school teacher, both of whom were hired on the same day. The Board determined
that the White teacher should be terminated. It is important to note that, although the
Black teacher had a Master's degree and the White teacher had only a Bachelor's
degree, the Board deemed the teachers equally qualified. Jan Crawford Greenburg,
Civil Rights Groups Pay Teacher to Avoid Court, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1997, § 1, at 1;
Steven A. Holmes, A Dilemma Led to a Deal over Hiring Tied to Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
23, 1997, at 37. The parties reached a settlement with financial assistance from civil
rights groups that "were concerned that the conservative 5-4 majority of the
[Supreme] Court might further weaken affirmative action .... The High Court then
dismissed the appeal, precluding a sweeping opinion based on this flawed and
inappropriate case." Yvonne Scruggs-Leftwich, Understanding the Piscataway Settle-
ment, FOCUS, Dec. 1997, at 4. See Barry Bearak, Settlement Ends High Court Case on
Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al; Greenburg, supra, at 1; see also infra
notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
100. No. 90-C5372, 1992 WL 80546, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1992).
101. Id. Defendants included trustees of a city college district as well as the Dean
of Adult Continuing Education and Assistant Dean of Continuing Education at
Olive-Harvey College, one of the Chicago, Illinois, city colleges. Id.
102. Id. at 1.
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black female replaced a white male. My credentials far exceeded
hers. ' 3 Hein provides no information about relative qualifications of
the plaintiff and the Black faculty who received the position. How-
ever, where comparisons have to be made, there should be no
assumption of automatic superiority of Whiteness. Nor should un-
due weight be given to "credentials" associated with Whiteness
while denigrating attributes associated with non-Whites.
In Silver v. City University of New York,"° a White male economics
professor challenged City University of New York's (CUNY) selec-
tion of a Black woman for the designation of Distinguished
Professor.0 5 The district court held that CUNY had legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for failure to select him and that the plaintiff
had failed to show that these reasons were pretextual.'16 At the time
that plaintiff applied for the Distinguished Professorship, CUNY
instituted an affirmative action policy that specified that the group
of Distinguished Professorship nominees presented to the board of
trustees " 'should include a very significant representation of
minorities and females.' "'07 Silver was considered by a committee
that recommended both him and a Black woman. 8 A Review
Committee consisting of all College Deans, the Chair of the Faculty
Senate, and the Provost failed to recommend Silver for the Distin-
guished Professorship.' Instead, it recommended the posthumous
appointment of a Black woman candidate who had died before the
Committee's vote."0
After losing at a grievance proceeding and failing in his
claim before the EEOC, Silver filed suit against CUNY alleging that
he did not win the honor "because he is a victim of ... reverse
discrimination against white male candidates .... .""' CUNY admit-
ted that Silver was qualified for the position of Distinguished
Professor"2 but contended that whether he was the most qualified
person at the time of appointment was a question of fact, and
103. Id.
104. 767 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 947 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1991).
105. Of the approximately 2300 full professors on the CUNY system faculty,
CUNY honors a small number of truly extraordinary scholars as Distinguished
Professors. Applicants for the honor "must be a Full Professor and 'a person of
outstanding merit and accomplishment in his/her field.' "Id. at 495.
106. Id. at 499.
107. Id. at 496.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 497. At the time of the trial, 79% (68 of 87) of the distinguished professor
seats were held by White men. Id. at 496.
112. Id. at 497.
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CUNY considered the woman to be the most qualified." CUNY's
President stated in his affidavit that once minorities and women
were identified for the honor, "they must be judged on merit."' 1 4
Thus, the claim of "reverse discrimination" did not assist the White
male plaintiff, and the defendant was granted summary judgment."5
In Cohen v. Community College of Philadelphia,"' a case in which the
court reviewed the candidates' comparative credentials and concurred
in the hiring committee's determination that the White candidates less
qualified than the Black candidates."7 Such a judgment may push the
idea of "reverse discrimination" to the forefront, prompted by the
frequent assumption that Whites are automatically more qualified
than Blacks. Cohen concerned the selection of Black faculty for the
Music and Art Departments of a two-year public college in which
the White plaintiffs claimed "reverse discrimination." Three Black
persons were selected by the Music Department, one of whom the
White plaintiffs, Sokolsky and Coward, themselves had "joined with
the other members of the music hiring committee in unanimously
recommending" for a faculty position."' The court observed that
"[iun light of this fact, it is difficult to understand how the plaintiffs
can now argue that the decision to hire [the Black candidate] was
motivated by racial discrimination.""9 Although the White candi-
dates both had Masters degrees,' ° one of the Black candidates had a
Ph.D. 2' and another had both a Masters degree in piano and a spe-
cial talent for performance, an area in which the college had
expressed a particular need."2 The White complainants had taught at
the college part-time and in guest lectureships but were not offered
full-time positions as were the Black persons selected for the Mu-
sic Department."3 The court found that the three Black faculty
113. Id.
114. Id. at 498. The court found no discriminatory motive and noted that, "since
CUNY's minority policy went into effect, [President] Harleston made 10 distin-
guished professor nominations, five of whom were white males and five minorities
and/or women." Id.
115. Id. at 500.
116. 484 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
117. Id. at 424-26.
118. Id. at 425.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 426.
122. Id.
123. Plaintiffs lost their part-time positions and guest lectureships as a result of
their complaints. Thus, they prevailed on their retaliation claim even though the
institution prevailed against their "reverse discrimination" charges. Id. at 428.
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members appointed in the Music Department "were not in any way
'less qualified.' ,,24
In the Art Department, the Black candidate was judged to be
more qualified than the White candidate who, the school could reasona-
bly conclude, "did not satisfy the hiring committee criteria," ' given that
what the institution needed was "a person with the specific ability to
teach a course in African and Afro-American art."12 The White candi-
date, plaintiff Cohen, "never even made the claim that she was
prepared to teach Afro-American art courses until after she learned that
[the Dean] had recommended another candidate for the position."'2
Although a hiring committee for the Art Department position made
Cohen its first choice, one member "conceded that Ms. Cohen would
have to teach the African/Afro-American field to herself before she
could present any courses to students."12 Moreover, the court noted
that even if the plaintiff had been qualified for the position, she still
could not have prevailed because the Black candidate selected was
also qualified for the position.! The court's conclusion that equal
qualifications of Black and White candidates does not entitle the White
to be chosen is a clear rejection of the idea that the color White is a
qualifier. Nevertheless, color consciousness remains a significant fac-
tor.
CONCLUSION
[Riacism in America is much more complex than either the
conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of
a few ignorant bigots. It is part of our common historical ex-
perience and, therefore, a part of our culture. It arises from
the assumptions we have learned to make about the world,
ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our
fundamental social activities.130
American culture is so saturated with racial myths that one
must make a concerted effort to separate the real from the unreal.
Because of those myths, the observations of one author ought to be
124. Id. at 425.
125. Id. at 416.
126. Id. at 422.
127. Id. at 423.
128. Id.
129. The court specifically noted that even the "plaintiff's brief refers to [the
successful Black candidate] as 'a specialist in the area of African art.' "Id. at 423-24.
130. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987).
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kept in mind when dealing with "reverse discrimination": "If racial
stereotyping is deeply embedded in American culture, then it is
simply implausible that negative assumptions by whites do not
influence their judgments of black workers.,'131 Negative assump-
tions may well play a role in "reverse discrimination" allegations.
For example, there is no basis for a racial discrimination claim when
White candidate X is selected over White candidate Z. To conclude
that candidate Z should have been selected when candidate X is
Black suggests, in the language of the rhyme, familiar to African
Americans, that "White is all right"-i.e., that a White is always
more qualified than a Black. However, when there is a choice of
whom to select for a benefit, if the Black candidate who ultimately is
selected, is as qualified as the White complainant, he or she should
have no basis for complaint. The Cohen court made this point when
it noted that the Black person selected for a faculty position was
qualified .' Decision-makers should neither deliberately nor inad-
vertently prompt claims of "reverse discrimination" by simply
relying upon the color black as a shorthand way of expressing par-
ticular attributes or qualifications that a successful Black possesses.
While the Piscataway case does not involve higher education, it
is instructive, for it helps to illustrate how racial considerations may
affect one's view of qualifications because a White without a gradu-
ate degree was thought to be equally qualified as a Black with a
graduate degree. 1n In Piscataway, a New Jersey school district had to
cut its business staff of ten teachers by one.IM The two teachers with
the least seniority had been hired on the same day, but one was
Black and the other White.1' The school board defended its decision
to retain the Black on diversity grounds.'6 The plaintiff claimed
"reverse discrimination" because the school board had deemed both
teachers equally qualified. 37 The matter was settled before the
United States Supreme Court could decide the case . 38 This resolution
prompted sobs by Williams, the Black teacher, who disagreed with
the conclusion that the teachers were equally qualified as she had a
131. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance
of Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325,343 (1992).
132. Cohen, 484 F. Supp. at 425.
133. Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 2506, cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1998).
134. 91 F.3d at 1551.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Actually, the plaintiff already had been rehired before the suit reached the
Supreme Court. For a general discussion of the Taxman case, see supra note 99.
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masters degree while the White plaintiff had no graduate degree."9
"The lower courts were unaware of Williams' claim that her master's
degree made her better qualified than Taxman who only had a
bachelor's degree."''
In addition to influencing decisions regarding qualifications,
color consciousness may also lead to suspicion of any decision
where a Black is favored over a White. Moreover, since White faculty
are the statistical norm in the Academy, some may come to expect
that a White person should always prevail in decisions about higher
education faculty. The cases above contradict the notion that
"reverse discrimination" allegations will aid White faculty against
White institutions of higher education. The deference141 given to
predominantly White academic institutions142 may also operate to
benefit colleges or universities faced with "reverse discrimination"
claims. It is critical that these institutions not allow fears of un-
founded "reverse discrimination" claims to prevent them from
hiring, promoting and granting tenure to Black faculty. The term is
"covert[ly] ... political [and] ... should be removed from the vocabu-
lary of any serious academician .... As it is currently used, it should
be identified as an appeal to a particular political ideology or policy
preference, rather than accepted as an expression which is neutral in
tone . . . ."' The odds that one will encounter a Black professor
139. Greenburg, supra note 99, at 14.
140. Scruggs-Leftwich, supra note 99, at 4.
141. Judicial deference to university decision-makers is considered to be part of
an overall doctrine of academic abstention, which is tied to some vague concept of
autonomy. HARRY T. EDWARDS & VIRGINIA DAVIS NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND
THE LAW 14-17 (1979); see also John J. Byrnes, Academic Freedom vs. Title VII: Will
Equal Employment Opportunity Be Denied on Campus?, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 989 (1981)
(arguing for less judicial deference to academic institutions); Barbara A. Lee, Balanc-
ing Confidentiality and Disclosure in Faculty Peer Review: Impact of Title VII Litigation, 9
J.C. & U.L. 279 (1982-83) (proposing that courts be less deferential when examining
the procedural integrity of the academic peer review process); Harry F. Tepker, Jr.,
Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Academic Autonomy: Toward a Principled
Deference, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1047 (1983) (discussing how judicial deference to
higher educational institutions does not mean tolerance of discrimination).
142. In contrast to the 2.35% of Black faculty at White institutions, approximately
40% of the faculty at the HCBUs supported by the United Negro College Fund are
not Black, with the vast majority being White. Robert Bruce Slater, White Professors at
Black Colleges, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1993, at 67, 68. In cases by White
faculty against HBCUs, courts do not give the usual deference to academic institu-
tions. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dillard Univ., 499 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (suggesting
that the institution had an obligation to help a White faculty member adjust to an
HBCU). The plaintiff in Fisher was frequently absent when scheduled to teach and
"defied a university-wide order to cancel all classes [for an] inauguration ceremony
and instead scheduled an exam for her students." Hawkins, supra note 5, at 18; see
also Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826
(1983) (involving HBCU Savannah State College).
143. Fetzer, supra note 46, at 212-13.
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teaching "at the thousands of predominantly white institutions are
about 50 to 1."'" The politically charged idea of "reverse discrimina-
tion" should not be allowed to prevent those odds from being
lowered.
144. Why the Shortage of Black Professors?, J. BLAcKs HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1993,
at 25, 25.
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